Interactions Between Inflation and Trade-Regime Objectives in Stabilization Programs by Anne O. Krueger
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
INTERACTIONS BETWEEN INFLATION AND
TRADE-REGIME OBJECTIVES IN STABILIZATION PROGRAMS
Anne 0.Krueger
WorkingPaper No. 1T5




This paper was prepared for the Brookings Institution
Conference on Economics Stabilization in Developing
Countries, October 25—26, 1919 in Washington, DC. The
research reported here is part of the NBER's research pro-
ject in International Studies. Any opinions expressed are
those of the author and not those of the National Bureau
of Economic Research.NBER Working Paper 475
May, 1980
Interactions Between Inflation and Trade—Regime
Objectives in Stabilization Programs
ABSTRACT
Thispaper examines the relationship between macroeconomic objectives
of controlling inflation and trade—regime objectives in stabilization
programs of developing countries. It is seen that there need be, in
principle, no close relationship between the two, as a crawling peg
exchange—rate policy can prevent inflation from affecting the perfor-
mance of the foreign sector. In practice, trade regime objectives
have been linked with inflation—reducing objectives, often to the detri-
ment of resource allocation and growth. Differences between devaluation
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Interactions Between Inflation and Trade—Regime
Objectives in Stabilization Programs
Introduction
Examination of the relationship between macro-economic
growth and the trade objectives of stabilization programs is
an exceptionally difficult assignment. There are three separate
bodies of relevant literature --relatingto trade regimes, to
inflation and its causes and consequences, and to the determi-
nants of economic growth --eachof which is pertinent to the
analysis and each of which has numerous points of contention. This
in itself makes the assignment challenging. In addition, the sorts
of problems that arise with inflation, with trade and payments
regimes, and with development strategies in general, are sufficiently
different between countries so that no single model is appropriate
for all of them.
To make the task manageable, I propose to start by setting
forth a very elementary framework for analyzing the relationship
between the trade regime and monetary-macro aggregates. Within
this framework, it is readily seen that, in principle, the interaction
between different types of inflation and the trade regimes can be
minimal. The costs of altering either the anticipated rate of
inflation or the nature of the trade regime, and the effects of
those states and changes on economic growth, are then briefly set
forth. The next section of the paper then examines the more4
prevalent case in which the authorities' efforts to contain inflation
are reflected in a trade regime and real exchange rate different
from that which would be chosen in the absence of the inflationary
pressures, and traces the interaction between inflation and the
trade regime. With that background, the next section then sets
forth a classification of types of stabilization programs and
analyzes the sorts of policy issues that arise in each category and
their relationship to economic development. A final section examines
the main trade-offs that arise in deciding on the components of a
stabilization program.
The Price Level -ExchangeRate -TradeRegime Relationship
Depending on the question at hand, the appropriate model for
analyzing any one of the three topics indicated in the section heading
can be quite different. Determination of the price level is a macro—
monetary phenomenon, although in the short run cost—push and microeconomic
phenomena (such as a good harvest) can enter into its determination.
In an open economy with full convertibility and no quantitative
restrictions upon international transactions, the exchange rate is
likely to be a monetary phenomenon as well. If, however, quantitative
restrictions apply to a large number of international transactions, the
exchange rate will also be an important variable in affecting two
significant relative prices: that between home goods and tradable
goods, and that between the domestic prices of exportables and of
import-competing goods. Finally, the trade regime itself consists of5
the policies and instruments used by a country to achieve two
targets, the first being the relationship between domestic prices
of import-competing and exportable goods and the second, balance in
transactions between residents and foreigners.
In principle, appropriate use of policy instruments can achieve
total separation of the causes and consequences of the rate of prict
level increase from any impact upon the trade regime. Such a
circumstance is seldom found in the real world (although as will be
argued the sliding peg regime can provide a fairly close approximation
to it), but it is useful to establish the basic relationships. Within
that context, analysis of alternative trade regimes, and their causes
and consequences for economic growtI can be carried out.
Table 1 provides a schematic representation of the three markets
and their relationship to trade regimes. The basic proposition
underlying the analysis is that for any price level, there correspoid.
an exchange rate which will leave the real variables in the system
unaltered. This is nothing other than an application of the dichotomy
to the international arena: if all demand and supply functions are
homogeneous of degree zero in prices and money income, then it follows
that for any rate of increase in the money supply, there is a
corresponding (and equal) proportionate appreciation or depreciation
of the currency that will leave all excess demand functions in the
system unaltered by the change)'6
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The three markets involved are traded goods, home goods, and
the money market.?1' Under a flexible exchange rate regime, all
three markets clear with individuals free to carry out their desirei
transactions at prevailing prices. The traded goods market clears
with the exchange rate (price of foreign exchange) E, equating the
foreign prices of the home country's importable and exportable
foreign prices of the home country's importable and exportable
(p and p) with foreign prices of the same goods, denoted with an
asterisk. The term (1 +t)is included in the import price relation
to indicate that flexible exchange rates are compatible with any
tariff structure and level of desired prOtection for import-competing
industries, a point to which we shall return below. Under flexible
exchange rates, the money market naturally clears, as does the market
for home goods. For later reference, it is convenient to note that
we have denoted the market clearing price for home goods under
flexible exchange rates as (ph/E)°. This notation is useful in
that the home goods market always clears: what differentiates
different regimes is the relative price of home goods (and therefore
their relative importance in domestic production): a higher market—
clearing price for home goods corresponds to greater domestic production
and, of course, consumption of those goods.-"
Under a flexible-rate regime, any change in the anticipated
rate of inflation is reflected in a shift in the excess demand
function for foreign exchange. Abstracting from short-run phenomena8
(such as J-curve responses of exports and imports to the changed
short-run price of tradable goods relative to home goods), the
market for tradable. goods will be unaffected in real terms.
Thus, if inflation were perfectly anticipated, the time path of the
exchange rate and the domestic price level would coincide in such a
way that the relative price of tradable and home goods remained
stable.
To be sure, inflation is never smooth and perfectly anticipated.
Under fixed exchange rates, the real exchange rate is affected, and
to that attention will turn below. For present purposes, however,
the central point is that there is a way in which the payments
regime can be fairly well insulated from the effects of inflation:
permitting or insuring that the real exchange rate is not influenced
by changes in the domestic pricelevel.-" Forpurposes of analysis,
it is useful first to proceed to discuss the costs of inflation and
the costs of alternative trade regimes on the assumption that inflation
does not affect the real rate of exchange and that the real exchange
rate does not affect the rate of inflation.
Growth under Alternative Trade Regimes
In the context of developing countries' economies, the key link
between the trade regime and economic growth is the way in which the
trade regime is employed in relation to the domestic growth pattern.
Economic theory tells us that new resources should be allocated
among tradable-goods industries in such a way that at the margin9
resources devoted to saving a dollar of foreign exchange should be
the same as the marginal resources devoted to earning a dollar of
foreign exchange. However, there is also a need on the part of
developing countries to provide infant industry support to many of
these activities. Such support can be of several kinds, but prominent
among the techniques used in many developing countries has been the
trade regime: it has been employed to protect domestic producers
against competition from imports. Such a policy, import substitution
(IS), has generally resulted implicitly or explicitly in discouragement
of exports. The alternative means of encouraging growth of tradable
goods industries consists of providing incentives primarily for
production, in which case it usually results that a large fraction
of incremental output is exported. Very often, encouragement is
given to exports directly.
For a variety of reasons, most countries seem to have
industrialization and trade policies that result in a significant
bias toward either export promotion (EP) or IS. The extent of bias
is defined as the degree to which the ratio of the domestic prices of
importables to exportables diverges from their international price
ratio. Thus, using the terminology of Table 1 and assuming the
appropriate aggregation across commodity categories has been performed,




The greater the divergence of B from unity in either direction,
the more biased the regime. Bs greater than unity represent a
bias toward import substitution, while those less than unity
represent biases toward export promotion.
Without going into the reasons in any great detail, IS regimes
tend to become increasingly biased toward IS over time as export
earnings fail to grow as rapidly as demand for imports, as the
exchange rate tends to be set at unrealistic levels, as the
incremental value of output per unit of investment decreases with
small sizes of domestic markets and as opportunities for further
[S diminish rapidly. Also, IS regimes often tend increasingly
toward quantitative restrictions upon imports, and fairly detailed
quantitative controls over domestic economic activity. All of
these phenomena seem to result in a fairly unsatisfactory rate of
economic growth for the countries undertaking the policies. A
simplistic summary of experience with rs for most developing countries
would be that, after opportunities for "easy" IS were exhausted,
growth rates have tended to slow significantly, either secularly,
or in a stop-go pattern as foreign exchange availability has
determined the rate at which the economy could grow. For present
purposes, it should be noted that one of the self—reinforcing
phenomena with IS is that the implicit discouragement of export
growth tends to increase the apparent "shortage" of foreign exchange.11
The built-in tendency for IS to decelerate as it continues may
be the most important long—run growth cost of IS regimes, but there
are also others that should be noted briefly. Chief among these is
that IS regimes tend to promote a fairly indiscriminate pattern of
industrial development. High-cost, inefficient industries develop
alongside lower-cost potentially efficient ones. Even where the
domestic market for the product is sufficiently large to permit
efficient-size plants to be established, low—cost firms have
difficulty expanding at a rate much faster than the rate of growth
of domestic demand. Low-cost and high-cost firms therefore tend
to expand pan passu, in part because the disincentive to export is
so great that few firms can profitably do so, and in part because
controls tend to set up quasi-monopoly positions for individual firms
that insure maintenance of market share: allocation of rights to
import scarce intermediate goods and raw materials very often rigidify
individual firms' market shares. To be sure, not all of these costs
of an IS regime are inevitable, as alternative means of fostering IS
can have significantly different results. Nonetheless, the evidence
strongly suggests significant tendencies in this direction.
Export promotion policies can also be carried out in a variety
of ways, some superior to others. The reader should bear in mind
that the definition of bias indicates the extent to which an EP
strategy is followed: all countries have "export promotion"
strategies, but in many cases those strategies are really only a means12
ofoffsetting some of the disincentives built into the system by
IS policies, as IS industries receive stronger incentives still.
In those cases, exports often consist of "excess capacity" output
of IS industries, and do not necessarily represent industries with
long—run comparative advantage.
Thereasons that countries which have genuinely biased their
regimes toward export promotion have tended to experience more
satisfactorygrowth rates can be summed up asthe counterpart of
the IS problems: stop-go patterns do not seem to emerge due to
foreign exchange bottlenecks; efficient low-cost firms can expand
very rapidly well beyond the limits of the domestic market; and
domestic monopoly positions do not spring up as firms are forced
to compete for their customers abroad and heed quality control and
specifications.In addition, despite bias toward EP, the extent of
the bias cannot get too great: countries adopting IS with the
domestic price of importables twice or more the international
price are frequently noted; countries with EP with a bias of more
than 25 or 30 percent towards exports are rare.
From this brief glimpse of the factors differentiating growth
patterns under EP and IS,.1 it is evident that there can be significant
impacts upon economic growth rates by the choice of strategy adopted.
But, in the presence of a fairly convertible exchange rate permitted
to move with changes in the rate of inflation, it is not evident
that the rate of inflation need be a factor in the choice of trade
strategy: the two are or can be independent.13
Inflation and Growth
There is presently in economics a revival of interest in the
costs of inflation, and little time need be spent on them here.
As inflation accelerates, transactions costs rise and individuals
seek stores of value to replace money in that function. These can
be costly activities, as potentially productive resources (such as
those producing gold and real estate), are diverted to providing a
store of value with little increase in society's real product
resulting. In addition, to the extent that countries have geared
their spending and taxing policies to stable prices, the costs of
the distortions introduced by the tax system may be quite large.
Finally, in cases where there is credit rationing and borrowers
are paying negative real rates of interest, as has occurred in
many LDCs, significant resource misallocation can arise on that
account.
These costs may be highly significant, and it is not intended
to minimize their importance. There is little hard evidence,
however, that the rate of inflation itself affects the rate of
growth via these channels. Given the structure of production in
most developing countries, it is likely that the biggest impact
of inflation on growth in LDCs has arisen when the underlying premise
of this section has been violated: a major and detrimental impact
of inflation has been the erosion of the real exchange rate with
significant results for the country's trade and payments position14
and the nature of its trade regime. It is these costs which must
be analyzed in order to evaluate the impact of stabilization programs
upon economic growth.
Altering the Trade Regime.
If bias toward IS were provided only by tariffs or export
subsidies, alteration of the trade regime could be accomplished
by altering the tariff or subsidy rates. However, as already
stated, IS policies are often carried out through quantitative
restrictions,and alteration of the bias of the regime entails
shifting from reliance upon QRs to reliance upon prices, and may
indeedinvolve replacing the bias imparted by QRs with a similar
bias imparted by tariffs.
One of the difficulties of altering trade regimes is that the
extent of bias is frequently not known. Especially when QRs are
important, it turns out that a move from QRs to tariffs alters the
bias of the regime much more than intended by the authorities: they
are simply unaware of the protective equivalent of the quotas..
Regardless of the way in which bias toward IS is reduced,Z1' re-
source reallocation will follow. Should the profitability of existinrJ
industries be reduced (as for example if there is an increase in
the value of import licenses issued) without any offsetting stimulus
to other industries, a reduction in the level of economic activity
is the likely outcome. This is especially the case if expansion of
the industries whose relative profitability has increased will require15
investments to expand capacity, while output can contract innediate1y
in IS industries. For, entrepreneurs without experience in exporting
activities may be very reluctant to base large-scale investments
upon the expectation that they can profitably sell international
markets: on one hand, they may be inexperienced in those markets
and be unaware of the opportunities facing them; on the other hand,
they may be well aware of those opportunities, but fear that the
altered bias of the trade regime (with a more favorable real
exchange rate) may not last, thereby rendering investment unprofitable.
These considerations pinpoint two aspects of any adjustment
process which involves a shift in the bias of the regime: on one
hand, there is likely to be something of a disparity between the
rate at which existing industry cuts back production and the rate
at which potentially new industries increase output;' on the other
hand, the role of expectations is crucial in determining how significant
and long-lived the disparity is. If entrepreneurs are convinced that
the change in incentives is permanent, the disparity may not last long.
If, on the other hand, there are significant doubts about the ability
of the authorities to maintain the new relative price structure, output
of industries encouraged by the former bias of the regimemay contract
while there are few moves made to start increasing output along new
lines. It is this latter case in which the growth costs of a shift
in the trade regime can be potentially substantial.
It seems evident, therefore, that an attempt to alter the bias
of a trade regime should be accompanied by some stimulus to activity16
in the newly-profitable industries, and perhaps also some increase
in the general level of aggregate demand to offset whatever decline
will come about in the adversely-affected industries. The severity
of the downward pressure on the level of economic activity depends
upon a number of factors, including the degree to which bias is
being altered, the height of the protective barriers being reduced,
the degree of uncertainty as to the permanence of the altered
incentive structure, and the length of time the incentive structure
has been in place. Even in the absence of any inflationary pressures
or other objectives, a policy shift with regard to trade strategies
is likely, therefore, to entail some short—run costs in terms of the
rate of economic growth. If the shift is successful, however, the
short-term loss may be earning a relatively high rate of return in
the form of improved resource allocation and more rapid growth in
future periods. A major question, of course, is how the costs of
such a shift may be minimized and, simultaneously, the extent to
which policies can be introduced to offset part or all of the short—
term losses. It seems best, however, to consider that question in
the context of a total stabilization policy package.
Costs of Reducing the Inflation Rate
Little needs to be said here about the difficulties involved in
reducing the rate of inflation in developing countries. There have
been a few notable instances of successful, and fairly painless, sharp17
drops in the rate of inflation, but they are the exception rather
than the rule. Israel in the mid-l950s, Turkey in 1958-59, and
South Korea in the late l950s and early 1960s are three countries
that were able successfully to bring about a reduction in their
inflation rates of two-thirds or more. In those instances there
was little retardation in the rate of economic growth.!'
A more prevalent pattern appears to be one in which "stabi1izatio
programs are adopted, and some deceleration of inflation occurs.
That deceleration, however, is accompanied by recession. In some
instances, such as Brazil in the mid-1960s, the costs of stabilization
in the form of below-capacity output were borne for several years,
until the inflation rate had been significantly reduced. Even more
frequently, however, recession and its effects have put such
pressure on the political authorities that the stabilization attempt
has been abandoned. The Chilean experience of the 1950s and 1960s
seems to have been characterized by this sort of stabilization)-W
The cost of reduced inflation was recession, and resumption of
economic growth occurred only after the stabilization effort was
abandoned; with resumed growth, the rate of inflation (and the bias
toward import substitution) once again increased.
For later reference, there is one aspect of attempts to reduce
inflation that should be noted. That is that there is one type of
deflationary policy which can simultaneously assist in altering
the bias of the regime and reducing the inflation rate: increasing
the flow of imports. To the extent that financing can be found18
to achieve such an increase, purchasing power is absorbed while the
implicit or explicit bias toward import substitution is substantially
reduced. This feature is of special significance in considering
stabilization policies and ways in which measures can be taken to
improve the likelihood of their success and reduce their short-term
costs.
Interactions Between Inflation and the Trade Regime
As already mentioned, determinants of the rate of inflation
and of the bias of the trade regime are, in principle, largely
separate. One of the policy measures that can be taken to reduce
the distortion and growth costs of inflation is a sliding peg
exchange rate regime. To be sure, the optimal real exchange rate
which is itself a function of the desired bias in trade strategy
and other variables will not under all circumstances remain the
same. As Carlos Diaz noted for Colombia, with the fluctuations
that country has faced in the price of coffee, there is probably
no exchange rate that was not an equilibrium rate at one time or
another)" Nonetheless, while alterations in the realexchange
rate may prove desirable in response to altered prices for the
country's exports on the world market or for other reasons
(including a desire to shift the bias of the trade regime) there
is little likelihood that rates of inflation will reflect only
those changes.19
Thus, if a country with a fixed exchange rate found that its
price level was beginning to increase more rapidly than that of its
trading partners, the best policy in the absence of willingness to
allow freely-fluctuating exchange rates would most likely be some
form of indexation (sliding peg) of the exchange rate. Various
formulae are possible: the exchange rate can be set relative to
a major trading partner in conformity with the differential between
the country's and the trading partner's inflation rate; a weighted
average of the rates of inflation adjusted for exchange rate
changes of several major trading partners can be deducted from
the country's own rate of inflation. In different circumstances,
the number of countries it is desirable to include in the calculus
can differ but in all cases adjustment must be made at fairly
short time intervals. Under any of these formulae, changes in
the rate of inflation will not have a significant impact upon the
nature of the trade regime. Such an indexation works best when
inflation rates are fairly stable or declining; there is some
tendency toward balance of payments deficit when inflation generate
by excess demand is accelerating over into the foreign exchange
market. Nonetheless, contrasted with the maintenance of a fixed
nominal rate of exchange under inflation, a sliding peg policy is
vastly to be preferred.
The difficulty, and one which results in the important
interaction between trade regimes and inflation, arises in countri20
that fail to adopt such a strategy. In those cases, inflation
tends to increase the purchasing power of domestic currency when
spent abroad relative to its value when spent at home. As a
consequence, domestic nationals tend to increase their purchases
abroad and reduce their sales abroad. In the absence of capital
controls, they also try to exchange domestic assets denominated
in domestic currency units for foreign assets denominated in
foreign currency units.
In those instances, countries have three choices: to incur
open balance-of-payments deficits; to alter the price paid and
received for foreign exchange defacto or de jure; or to impose
quantitative restrictions upon international transactions. In
practice, the response is usually to adopt some price measures,
such as surcharges upon imports and subsidies for minor exports,
to impose some QRs, and to permit a deficit in the balance of
payments to emerge, financed by running down foreign exchange
reserves or borrowing from abroad. Indeed, one characteristic
of many inflation—prone countries attempting to maintain a fixed
exchange rate is the proliferation of fairly detailed, ad hoc,
measures designed to curb excess demand for foreign exchange
side-by-side with the continued need to borrow from abroad to
finance deficits that emerge despite measures taken. This welter
of detailed and fairly specific measures itself has economic21
costs, and can be one motive for a stabilization operation --
"tidyingup" the regime.
For purposes of analysis, however, it is convenient to set
aside the use of price measures and mixed responses. If sufficient
price measures were undertaken on an across-the-board basis to
remedy the underlying tendency toward excess demand for foreign
exchange, such measures would amount to a sliding peg exchange-
rate policy. It is the absence of sufficient pricing measures
that forces countries experiencing inflation at fixed exchange
rates to adopt alternative measures.
The alternatives consist of incurring open balance—of-payments
deficits, financing them by running down reserves or borrowing
from abroad, or of imposing quantitative restrictions. Each of
these measures has costs and affects the nature of any subsequent
stabilization program. For purposes of analysis, it is useful to
analyze each type of response separately, although as already
indicated the two are often found in combination.
Table 1 is again useful as a frame of reference. It will be
recalled that the sliding peg (if pegged at the appropriate level) or
flexible exchange rate case was one where each market cleared and
participants were free to carry out desired transactions at the
prevailing prices. Incurring an open payments deficit is equivalent
to permitting an excess supply of money in the home market to22
spill over into realized excess demand for goods and services from
abroad (which is reflected in the payments deficit). By contrast,
exchange control is a case in which individuals are not permitted
to carry out their desired transactions: the domestic price of
importables exceeds the foreign price-cum-tariff, and the money
market consequently clears. The precise mix of these two policies
in use is a critical factor in determining the effects of policies
that are undertaken in a stabilization program.
Payments Deficit
The key characteristics of a response to excess demand by
permitting a payments deficit are two: on one hand, there is an
excess supply of money, and on the other hand, the relative price
of home goods is "too high," as aggregate consumption is above
sustainable levels, consumption of home goods increases, and the
failure of the price of tradables to use induces production to
shift toward home goods.
The excess supply of money is in part a reflection of the
fact that the fixed exchange rate acts as a suppressant to the
inflation that would otherwise result from aggregate demand
pressures. In the case of a sliding peg exchange rate policy,
the entire inflationary stimulus is passed through both the home
goods and the traded goods sector: both prices increase nominally
and there is no relative price change. In the case of a fixed23
exchange rate, home goods prices rise (although notby as much
as they would under a sliding peg becauseconsumers are permitted
to substitute traded goods for home goods in theirconsumption
bundle while producers shift productionaway from traded and toward
home goods), but traded goods pricesare stable. The payments
deficit can be thought of as a reflection ofthat part of the
inflationary pressure which did not get reflected inprice
increases.
A straightforward way of viewing theproblem of a country
experiencing inflation and a payments deficit at a fixedexchange
rate is to recognize that the inflation rate isheld below that
which would otherwise be realizedas long as the exchange rate
can be maintained, both because the price of tradablegoods does
not rise and because the increase in theprice of home goods is
less than it would otherwise be. Under thosecircumstances,
devaluation is inflationary: it permits theinflationary impulse
to be passed on to the domestic market.Devaluation would therefore
accomplish little if a country could continueindefinitely to
finance its payments deficits!?!
The fact is, however, that countriescannot indefinitely
run down reserves or borrow from abroad forpurposes of financing
their deficits. Just as an individualconsumer can live well beyond
his means by running up credit cardcharges, borrowing from his bank,24
and depreciating his consumer durables, so too can a country live
beyond its means. In both cases, the situation is not sustainable.
It is for this reason that analysis of the costs, in terms of
growth prospects, of measures taken to eliminate an unsustainable
deficit is extremely difficult.In a sense, the economy incurring
a deficit and then reducing its expenditures relative to its income
is on a non-optimal path: its early level of expenditures and
outlay is too high, at the cost of a later reduction in that level.
For purposes of analysis, the best that can be done is to pose the
question in the following way: given an economy which has incurred
an unsustainable deficit, what is the lowest—cost way of altering
its expenditure-income relationship to reattain a sustainable future
expansion path? Consideration of this question is deferred until
the third section of this paper. At this point, it should merely be
noted that the line of analysis sketched out here applies to any
country's attempt to reduce the size of its payments deficit, actual
or in prospect. In many instances, stabilization programs have
objectives pertaining both to reducing the size of the prospective
deficit and to liberalizing the trade regime. Before analysis of
those programs can be carried out, therefore, it is necessary to
examine the differences between the goals and the problems implicit
in the two alternatives.25
Liberalizing the Trade Regime
As already mentioned, inflation at a fixedexchange rate
cannot long be sustained without incurring apayments deficit.
That is unsustainable, and the alternative is alteration ofthe
exchange rate or the imposition of quantitative restrictions
once access to further foreign credits becomes limited, as it
eventually must. They key characteristic of using QRs to keep
foreign exchange payments in line with receipts, as shown in
Table 1, is that the money market is permitted to clearwhile
the domestic price of importables rises above theimported price
(inclusive of landing costs, tariffs andsurcharges). Thus,
whereas an open payments deficit is characterizedby the
inappropriate relative price of tradable to nontradablegoods
(for any chosen tariff structure), •the quantitativerestrictions
equilibrium is characterized by a greater bias of the trade and
payments regime toward import-competing activities domestically
than would be chosen simply on the basis of theindustrialization
strategy. Whether home goods relative prices are likely to be
higher or lower than in the flexible-exchange rate alternative
is not clear-cut: depending on the nature of thestructure of
production and the degree of substitution betweenexportables,
importables and home goods in both consumption andproduction,
that relationship can go eitherway.26
The difference between the price that prevails for an import
in the home market if individuals were allowed to import all they
wished at the prevailing price and the price that would prevail
in the presence of quantitative restrictions upon imports is referred
to as the premium on an import license. The very fact that there
are premiums on import licenses is usually sufficient evidence to
indicate that quantitative restrictions are binding. Under those
circumstances, the bias of the trade and payments regime toward
IS is almost always greater than intended, and resource allocation
costs can mount well above those associated with the tariff—
generated protection.1"
Thus, althougheither an open payments deficit or the tightening
of quantitative restrictions can result from inflationary pressure
at a fixed exchange -ate, the symptoms and resource allocation
effectsof the two alternative responses are quite different: the
realizedrate of inflation for a given monetary stimulus will be
greater under a QR response than under a deficit response; the degree
of bias of the regime will be greater under the QR response than
under the deficit response; and the home-goods sector will likely
expand more under the deficit response than under the QR response)--"
When stabilization programs are adopted, therefore, it depends
crucially what mix of the two policies has been chosen, and of
course, how severelyrestrictive' the QRs have become or how
sizable the deficits are.27
When the response to potential deficits has been the imposition
of quantitative restrictions, increasing the price of foreign exchange
will operate rather differently than it will in the case of open
deficit. Suppose, for example, that an open deficit has been
incurred. Raising the price of foreign exchange while holding
tariffs constant will, in the absence of quantitative restrictions,
raisethe price of tradable goods relative to the price of noritradables.
For a small country with no monopoly power in trade, the relative
priceof exportables and import-competing goods will remain unaltered:
thebiasof the regime is unaffected, although production of both
import-competingand exportable goods becomes more profitable
relative to the profitability ofproducing home goods)-' If,
instead, QRs are in effectprior to the increase in the price of
foreign exchange, part of the increase in price will go to absorbing
the premiums on import licenses (thereby perhaps reducing the
variance in effective exchange rates across commodity categories).
If,as is usually the case, export subsidies are much smaller than
premiums on import licenses, a far higher fraction of the increased
price of foreign exchange will be reflected in the domestic price
of exportables than it will be in the domestic price of import-
competing goods. At the limit, in cases where the size of the
devaluation is less than the size of the preexisting premium on
import licenses, there is no reason to expect the domestic price
of importables to rise following a devaluation)1-"28
Several points should be noted.First, as a consequence of
premium absorption, the increase in the price level following a
devaluation in the context of preexisting QRs should be considerably
smaller than the recorded price increase following a deficit—
reducing devaluation.In a sense, this is the counterpart to
the statement that a given inflationary stimulus will result in
a larger rate of inflation under QRs than it will under an open
deficit given a fixed exchange rate: the devaluation has more work
to do correcting the relative prices of exportables and import—
competing goods and less work to do in adjusting the price level.
Second, in the absence of other policy moves, any devaluation Is
still likely to result in a reduction of the restrictiveness
of whatever quantitative restrictions are in effect. That is,
for given quantitative amounts of permitted imports, devaluation
automatically liberalizes a given trade regime, unless other
measures are taken to offset the increase in the price of foreign
exchange.' Third, because devaluation absorbs premiums upon
imports, it automatically alters the bias of the regime and thereby
induces the resource reallocation mechanisms discussed in the first
section of this paper.
Finally, there is the question of the macroeconomic impact of
a pure libera1izing" devaluation. Unlike the open deficit case,
where expenditures clearly have to be cut relative to income, the
"liberalizing" devaluation has no such imperative, except insofar29
as it was underlying the erosion of the real exchange rate which
led to the necessity to impose QRs in the first place. In
principle, therefore, if a QR regime were the result of past
inflationary pressures which had subsided, leaving the exchange
rate overvalued by a stationary amount, no deflationary stimulus
or reduction in the level of aggregate demand would be called for.
Indeed, in the pure QR case, it can even be argued that the
absorption of the premium bytheexchange rate increse, combined
with the benefits from resource allocation resulting from the change
in the bias of the regime, might well result in a mild deflationary
pressure on the economy)-.9! Quantitatively, however, it is not
evident that this deflationary pressure is likely to be significant.
StabilizationProgramsand Long—Term Development
As the foregoing has indicated, there is no one action that
can be described as a "stabilization program." The policies
undertaken, and their effects, vary depending on the underlying
situation and the goals of the policy makers.
It has already been indicated that the task of reducing the
rate of inflation is an exceptionally difficult one: almost
inevitably there is a short-term reduction in the rate of growth
of output, and in many cases, recession. In these circumstances,
deflationary policies are sometimes reversed so that few, if any,
benefits are realized. Likewise, the resource reallocation that
must accompany a successful effort to liberalize the trade regime30
and alter its bias away from import substitution cannot be achieved
without inevitable adjustments of resources within theeconomy.
For these reasons, there are bound to be short-run adjustment
costs of any stabilization program, whatever the nature of the
policy package and regardless of the degree to which it is
successful. There are, of course, ways of reducing those costs,
but it is doubtful whether stabilization can be accomplished in
the presence of unwillingness or political inability to withstand
some short-term disallocations. The first and most important
conclusion that can be drawn, therefore, is that it is senseless
to incur the costs of adjustment, only to reverse policies before
they have had any chance to affect resource allocation and growth.
Yet, the evidence is that a significant number of stabilization
programs have foundered precisely because the authorities have
been unwilling or unable politically to survive politicalpressure
during the adjustment period.?P1
A second conclusion, which follows readily from the first, is
that the reallocations will take longer and be more difficult the
greater are expectations that the realigned structure of relative
prices and incentives will not continue. If it is expected that
the devaluation and liberalization will be short-lived, businessmen
and consumers are likely to stockpile foreign goods in anticipation
of possible future reiniposition of QRs. In doing so, they increase
the current account deficit and therefore the foreign exchange31
outflow required to sustain the liberalization program through the
adjustment period. In the context of a situation in which foreign
exchange has earlier been in excess demand because of the trade
regime, increases in imports and current account deficits may
stimulate further speculation against the exchange rate, in turn
tending to force the reimposition of controls. In addition,
expectations of reversal discourage resource reallocation thus
blunting the increase in exports that might otherwise be experienced.
Thus, one objective of policy should be to insure that a
stabilization program, once undertaken, can be sustained long
enough to provide an opportunity for its results to be felt. This
in turn suggests that a desirable feature of any stabilization
program is that it should be designed in such a way as to suggest
to economic agents that it will succeed: expectations are likely
to be self—fulfilling. This conclusion has numerous implications
for policy, especially for the evaluation of the optimal lending
strategy for donors in connection with stabilization programs.
For thelonger term, the effects of stabilization onthe rate
of growth are a function of the objectives of the program (and
especially the extent to which the bias of the regime is shifted
away from undue emphasis upon import substitution) and the degree
to which they are accomplished. If, as was the theme of Section II,
stabilization policies are undertaken in the first place because
existing policies are unsustainable, it is difficult to talk about32
the growth effects of alternative packages except in the context
of the alternative stabilization packages: continuation of the
status quo ante is infeasible.It is for this reason that one
can regard the biggest growth cost of stabilization programs as
lying in their failure: when a program does not succeed, it is
generally inevitable that another program, with the same sort of
short-run costs, will have to be adopted in the future. To the
extent that every failure of such a program intensifies expectations
of failure of the next one, an unsuccessful stabilization program
may itself have growth costs, not only in the current slowdown
in economic activity which by definition has no payoff, but also in
the heightened cost of achieving the same objectives at any future
date, when memories of past failures make expectations more
skeptical about the likelihood of success. The Colombian experience
of the late 1950s and early 1960s is perhaps an excellent example:
after devaluation attempts which were unsuccessful in 1956, 1959,
1961 and 1966, the authorities successfully began altering the bias
of the related policies in 1967. Carlos Diaz—Alejandro concluded
that one of the major impacts on Colombian growth was that the
consequent growth of foreign exchange earnings from increasing
exports meant that the stop-go cycle of fiscal and monetary policy
surrounding stabilization efforts finally stopped, which in turn
permitted a more rapid rate of growth of the entire economy.-1133
It therefore seems appropriate to attempt to categorize
stabilization programs in terms first, of the primary objectives of
the program, then of the preexisting situation, and finally, the
policy measures taken.
Objecti yes
Despite the fact that almost all stabilization programs by
definition have some bearing on both inflation and balance of
payments objectives, the relative importance of the two objectives
can differ. In some instances, stabilization programs are geared
primarily toward reducing excess aggregate demand, with balance of
payments targets secondary.-" In other instances, the infeasibility
of continuing to incur indebtedness or of further tightening QRs
makes the primary target an alteration in the trade regime."
One fundamental lesson that seems to emerge from examination
of the cases in which devaluation did not succeed in relaxing the
foeign exchange constraint is that it does not make sense to tie
the success of the measures aimed at the foreign trade sector to
success in reducing the rate of inflation. It appears to be the
case that it is significantly easier to alter the real exchange
rate and to increase the rate of growth earnings than it is to reduce
the rate of inflation permanently. This is perhaps the strongest
argument that can be made on behalf of a sliding peg policy: it
permits the success of the trade component of a stabilization program
independently of whether the rate of inflation drops or not. In light34
of the already-stated result that one of the significant costs of
inflation lies in the distortions introduced by a fixed exchange
rate, it is difficult to understand countries which attempt to
alter their trade and payments regimes and inflation rates by
adopting a new, fixed exchange rate: if the rate of inflation does
drop, a sliding peg will not significantly alter the exchange rate,
and both objectives of the program will be met; if, however, inflation
is not successfully controlled, both objectives of the package are
bound to fail if a new, fixed exchange rate is set.
Because controlling inflation is inherently the more difficult
objective in most circumstances, and because those primarily concerned
with bringing the rate of inflation down are likely to object to a
sliding peg as being more inflationary than a new fixed exchange rate,
it seems to be the case that stabilization programs motivated more by
a desire to alter the trade and payments regime have a somewhat
greater probability of partial or total success than do programs aimed
primarily at the rate of inflation.
To be sure, neither sort of change --alterationof the trade
regime or changing the inflationary nature of the economy ——is
likely to be easy, for reasons already mentioned. Nonetheless, there
are degrees and degrees of difficulty, and controlling inflation does
seem much the more difficult of the two objectives.35
Preexisting Conditions
A number of circumstances in the preexisting situation also
have a bearing on the probable outcome of the stabilization package.
Among the most important are "chance" elements, the set of
macroeconomic influences currently operating on the economy, the
extent to which the trade regime has been characterized by QRs or
by open deficit, and the magnitude of foreign short-term indebtedness.
Turning to the chance factors first, two especially should be
noted. On one hand, favorable harvests can significantly increase
the probability that a stabilization program will prove successful.
This is because good harvests tend to keep the domestic prices of
foodstuffs relatively low, thereby exerting downward pressure on
the overall price index, and also because bumper crops tend to
increase quantities available for export, thus increasing foreign
exchange earning. The latter results either in increased foreign
exchange reserves, and thus conviction that the altered incentives
will continue or in an enhanced flow of imports, which in turn
permits a relatively greater degree of bias toward exportables
than would otherwise be possible. The other event that can
positively affect the outcome of a stabilization program is favorable
movements in the termsoftrade. Such an outcome has the same
sortof impact as the increased export earnings that can be
attained with a good harvest, although the impact is less favorable
on the inflation rate, and appropriate policies must be followed36
toprevent increased prices of key exports from resulting in large
increases in domestic money supply and purchasing power. There
have been instances of stabilization programs which, on the
historical record, appear to have had a good chance of success
which have foundered on unfavorable movements in the terms of
trade. The Brazilian devaluation-and-stabilization effort of
1957 appears to have been one such case: the volume of exports
increased almost fifty percent over the ensuing twenty-four months,
but export earnings rose hardly at all.-'
Macro influences are several-fold. First, there is the nature of
the monetary and fiscal policies in effect in the six to twelve months
prior to the stabilization effort. When those have been highly
expansionary, thedifficultiesentailed in successfully carrying
out stabilization are likely to be much greater than when monetary
and fiscal stimuli have been moderate. Indeed, it can even be
contended that, in the presence of highly expansionary monetary
and fiscal policy over the preceding year, a country would be better
off to postpone (if possible) altering the trade regime (especially
if a sliding peg is not a realistic alternative) until monetary and
fiscal magnitudes have been brought under control. Second, there
is the extent to which price controls have prevented excess demand
pressures from being realized. When those factors have been of
importance, it is usually necessary to remove those price ceilings
at the time the stabilization package is inaugurated. As prices
must rise from their formerly-controlled levels, any cost-push37
responses within the economy will be triggered by those increases
as well as the increase in the price of tradable goods thereby
making the task of reducing the rate of inflation more difficult.
Nonetheless, when price controls have been operative pre-stabilization,
their removal can be an essential part of the stabilization package.
When those controls are over public—sector products, they may have
been a significant factor in contributing to the public—sector
deficit and thus increases in the money supply. Such was the case
in Turkey in the late 1950s, when public sector enterprises were
required to maintain prices well below costs of production. Deficits,
financed by Central Bank credits, were a chief source of inflationary
pressure. Raising the prices of public sector enterprise outputs
resulted in a once-and-for-all increase in the price level by
20 percent, but simultaneously eliminated the further extension of
Central Bank credits. The consequence was that, after several years
of inflation recorded at 25 percent annually or more (despite the
price controls iiich had suppressed it), prices actually fell in
the two years following the increase in public sector enterprise
prices.
Finally, there is the preexisting situation with respect to
the trade regime and the balance of payments. For reasons outlined
above, it makes a significant difference which stabilization program
is aimed primarily at reducing or correcting an existing or prospective
open deficit, or whether instead it is intended to liberalize the
trade and payments regime and to reduce or eliminate quantitative38
restrictions as a means for keeping foreign exchange receipts in line
with payments. In addition, the degree to which debt—servicing
difficulties are being experienced and imports have been curtailed
prior to the stabilization program is also significant in influencing
the nature of the package and the probable effect of any given set of
policy changes.
In general, if imports have been sharply curtailed in the months
oryearsprior to stabilization, the prospects are that an increased
importflowcan significantly affect real output, even in the short—
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run.---If, on the other hand, imports are running at high levels,
a stabilization program which curtails imports will likely be
necessary. Import curtailment is in itself inflationary, aid may
also impairdoniest4cproduction levels if imports of intermediate
and capital goods are used more or less in fixed proportions in
domestic production.
The extent to which debt-servicing commitments exist prior to the
stabilization package, and the ways in which rescheduling is needed
and handled within it, are also important. The existence ofdebt—
servicing obligations which cannot be metreflects,to be sure,
the fact that the country has in the past lived beyond its means.
The fact that stabilization packages are often postponed until
debt—servicing obligations force governments into negotiations
with consortia of creditors is also a reflection of governments'
unwillingness to take the short-term costs of stabilization.39
The difficulties that can arise as a result of bargaining over
debt-rescheduling can be important, both politically and psychologically,
inaffecting a stabilization program. Pressing debt—service obligations
can induce governments to accept conditions from consortia of creditors
as a prerequisite for debt rescheduling. In some instances, this
may enable politicians to take measures they would not otherwise
politically be able to take. In other cases, politicians may not
accept the necessity for those measures, in which case they may
carry them out only belatedly and begrudgingly. In the latter
case, prospects for the longer-term success of the stabilization
programare small: the objectives arereally those of the creditors
andnot those of the debtor country.?W When debt—service
reschedulingbecomes critical, however, donors as well as debtors
are caught: failure to impose some conditions upon borrowers at
that time will force them to lend more later in the absence of
policy measures and, if a government is unresponsive, creditors
will eventually use the country's prospective default as a means
of correcting the situation.
Policies
As already stated, there is no single set of policies that
constitutes a "stabilization program." Programs can range all
the way from fairly minor adjustments of exchange rates and
macroeconomic policies with only limited objectives to attempts
to correct high rates of inflation and severely restrictive QRs.40
In terms of their effects on economic growth, the successful
stabilization programs are those that succeed in one or more of
the following: 1) significantly altering the bias of the trade
and payments regime away from import substitution; 2) moving the
economy away from reliance upon quantitative restrictions and
toward pricing measures; and/or 3) permitting a movement away from
stop--go cycles of growth resulting from a foreign exchange
"bottleneck."
Here, we discuss the policies that can constitute part of
such a program. First, there are the already—mentioned monetary
and fiscal policies. These often entail a reduction in the extension
of credit within the economy, ceilings upon levels of government
expenditures, and measures to increase tax collections. In addition,
they may involve the removal of price ceilings and other measures
which may have contributed to government deficits and increases in
the money supply. Reichmann and Stillson' have tabulated the
"financial programs" implemented as part of stabilization programs
for the 79 instances in which higher credit tranches were utilized
during the 1963-72 period. These cases involve both developed and
developing countries, but are nonetheless instructive. Their
classification of cases is reproduced in Table 2 below. In their
terms, "no deceleration" refers to cases where credit expansion
was to be permitted to continue at its present rate. As can be
seen, the single largest group of countries resorting to higher credit41
Table 2. Financial Programs as a Component of Stabilization
Programs, 79 Countries, 1963-72 (number of programs)
Credit Policy to be Implemented
Main Purposes Deceleration No Deceleration
Correction of overly expansionary 26
demand policies
Modification of exchange system and 4
correction of overly expansionary
demand policies
Modification of exchange system 7 13
Other 3 26
(of which:)
(Anti-recessionary program) (—) (5)
(Cope with temporary shortfall (—) (11)
in exports)
Total 40 39
Source: Rekhmanr and Stilison, p. cit., p. 297.42
tranches in IMF Stand-bys were categorized as having "overly
expansionary demand policies" and their rate of credit expansion
was to be reduced as part of their stabilization programs. There
were, however, 13 cases in which the objective was to modify the
exchange system and deceleration of credit expansion was not called
for. In some of these cases, the authorities had begun instituting
restrictive credit policies prior to the stand—by agreement, so no
furtherdeceleration was warranted.
Insome developing countries, notably Korea, a significant
componentof thealtered growth structure of the economy has
originated from interest-rate reforms undertaken in conjunction
with the reform of theexchangesystem. In Korea, inflation had
made the real interest rate significantly negative, and interest
rate reforms raised the nominal rate of interest from 5-8 percent
to 25-30 percent(with an inflation rate of about 20 percent).
Although other factors also contributed, the Korean savings rate
rose dramatically after the interest rate reforms and this factor
was one contributor to the large jump in the growth rate achieved
subsequently.
With the exception of the interest-rate reforms, however,
most macroeconomic policies adopted as part of a stabilization
program do not impact directly upon the three variables listed
above as being significant for growth prospects. Rather, they
constitute part of the background setting for alterations in the43
trade and payments regime and their chief significance lies in
determining whether the chosen nominal fixed exchange rate can
remain realistic in real terms for a significant period of time.
The trade-and-exchange--rate components of stabilizationprograms
are even more varied than their macro-monetary counterparts. The
sorts of policies adopted can be loosely categorized under four
main headings: exchange rate changes; liberalizing the import
regime; altering the bias of the regime; and debt rescheduling.
Exchange rate changes have been discussed. As indicated, a
part of the change in the nominal exchange rate is often absorbed
by the removal of export subsidies, import surcharges, and other
partial measures taken prior to devaluation, and it is "net,"
and not gross, deva1ution that affects individuals' decisions. To
be sure, there is probably some improvement in incentivesresulting
even from this tidying up, as the replacement of surcharges and
subsidies with the exchange rate usually results in greater uniformity
of incentives and effective exchange rates across transaction categories
than exists prior to the change.
The preceding analysis also demonstrated that the impact of a
net devaluation can be quite different depending on whether the
preexisting situation was one of a QR-achieved balance in payments
or of an open deficit. In the former case, alteration of the
exchange rate automatically results in some liberalization of the
regime and, insofar as export subsidies were not as large as import44
premiums,a reduction in the bias toward import substitution. In
an open-deficit prior situation, devaluation is more likely to result
in an equiproportionate rise in the domestic prices of tradables, and
thechief relative-price effect is the relative price of tradables
in terms of home goods.
Liberalizing the import regime can come about not only through
exchangerate changes when import premiums on licenses are absorbed,
butalsothrough alterations in the control mechanism itself..?'
Many stabilization programs have been accompanied by a revision of
the licensing system, often with the introduction of a group of
"priority" or "liberalized" imports, for which licensing procedures
are streamlined if not abandoned. A variety of techniques for
achieving liberalization have been used. In some countries, a shift
from a "positive" list (only items listed are permitted to be
imported) to a "negative" list (all items not listed may be freely
imported) has resulted in significant liberalization. In other
countries, removal of "guarantee deposit" requirements, under which
would-be importers deposit amounts equal to some multiple of their
import license with the central bank pending receipt of the import,
can represent a sizable liberalization. In Chile, for example,
the authorities have imposed guarantee deposit requirements of
10,000 percent in periods of severe foreign exchange shortfalls
prior to devaluation, and removal of those requirements has defacto
permitted a resumption of imports." Even moving from monthly
to quarterly or semi-annual import programs can result in liberalization45
of the regime, as can such measures as permitting the resale of
import licenses and removing restrictions on currency areas in
which licenses are utilized.
Alteration of the bias of the regime comes about through the
exchange rate change itself (insofar as it is net), with absorption
of premiums on import licenses as the regime is liberalized, and
also through policies designed directly toencourage exports.
Especially important can be assurances to exporters that the newly—
achieved real exchange rate for exports, and other incentives for
exports, will continue. In some instances, this has been accomplished
inpart bythe removal of domestic taxes on export production. In
Brazil, for example, removal of state and federal taxes on exports
made seliinq dmestcallyand sellingabroad at two-thirds the price
approximately equally profitable.P/
Finally,there is the matter of debt—rescheduling and borrowing
tofinance an increased flow of imports. Debt rescheduling is often
a prerequisite for any degree of liberalization of the regime and
continued economic growth because, by the time of the stabilization
program, the country's existing debt-service and repayment obligations
are so large that the alternatives are default or an import bill so
small that domestic economic activity will have to beseverely
curtailed. Inadditionto rescheduling, creditors, and especially aid
donors,have often extended additional credits to thecountry at the
time of stabilization to permit an immediate increase in theimport46
flow before export earnings and other foreign exchange receipts
respond to the altered incentives provided by devaluation and
its accompanying measures.
Trade-Offs in Stabilization Programs
Enough has been said already to pinpoint the chief areas of
trade-off in deciding upon the nature of a stabilization program.
Essentially, there are three crucial, and interrelated, areas
where significant trade-offs exist. The first is between the
short-run and the long-run. The second is between gradual but
continuing small changes and large changes. The third is between
more foreign borrowing and greater deflationary pressure as part of
the stabilization program.
Short-Run versus Long-Run
If one were to pinpoint the most significant trade—off
in stabilization programs, it is clearly the trade-off between
short-term cost and longer-term benefits. For reasons already
spelled out, stabilization programs are almost inevitably going
to entail some short-run costs as a necessary price for achieving
longer-run benefits. Especially when the changes that must be
brought about involve both the rate of inflation and the bias of
the trade regime, short-run adjustment is inevitable. Two or three
additional percentage points per year of growth of GNP can be
achieved by countries successfully altering their trade bias and
payments regime. For those countries, the short-term costs, which47
are probably on the order of one or two percentage points of GNP
for a year or eighteen months, are greatly exceededby the discounted
value of higher GNP at later dates.'
The difficulty, of course, is that politiciansmust inevitably
face the short term before reaching the long term. Themyopic nature
of the political process is well understood.Thus, one can well imagine
situations in which alteration of the bias of theregime might well
yield a social rate of return in excess of 15percent on the short
term costs and yet be rejected by the politicalprocess.
The fact that the politics of stabilizationare difficult makes
matters worse than they would otherwise be. Notonly are politicians
likely to use higher rates of discount thanmay be warranted, but the
fact that they may be unwilling to withstand thepressures that arise
during the transition period raises the possible costs ofembarking
on a stabilization program. For,while the benefits to be achieved
by a successful stabilization program involvingmoving away from
import substitution are not likely to be affected, the fact that
politicians may decide to abort a stabilizationprogram before its
benefits begin to be realized raises potentialcosts. A donor,
considering whether to push for a stabilizationprogram and shift of
trade orientation, must weigh thepossibility that the program may
be aborted (which will raise costs for thenext attempt) as well
as the costs of a successful program against thepotential benefits.
In large part, such a judgment is ofnecessity political, but that
makes the calculus no lessnecessary.48
Gradualism versus Shock
The fact that there are likely to be short—run costs associated
with any change makes the case for some degree of gradualism: it
may diminish the costs of adjustment. On the other hand, the fact
that there are likely to be built-in resistances to change (especially
among successful import—substitution establishments) and that
entrepreneurs must perceive changes in incentives makes a powerful
case for a fairly rapid shift in relative prices and in the trade
and payments regime.
Here again, the trade-off is much like that between the short run
and the long run. There is no doubt that a gradual shift in signals
is the more desirable policy if such gradualism does not affect the
chances of success of the policy package. If, however, gradualism
provides more of an opportunity for failure, as it almost surely
does, than a once-and-for-all reversal of signals, then the case for
a sharp, once-and-for-all shift in policies is stronger.
As with the short-term long-term trade—off, there are
differences between countries in the likelihood that gradual
alteration of the regime can be sustained. However, there is
undoubtedly some critical minimum initial shift that is essential
in order for businessmen and others to perceive that the regime is
really altered, and it probably a mistake to accept too gradual an
approach. Indeed, there is not a great deal of evidence available
as to the different costs of larger once-and-for—all changes and
smaller ones spread out over a longer period of time. Nonetheless,49
in view of the political difficulties thatare likely to arise if
there is a long time period during whichadjustment is taking place
with few visible signs of success, there isa presumption in favor
of a once—and—for-all sharp adjustment.
Foreign Borrowing versus Recession
To achieve a given degree of liberalization ofimports (and
consequent alteration of bias of the regime), either the level of
imports must be increased or income must be reduced in sucha way
that the demand for imports shifts downward.Thus, liberalization
can be achieved either by increasing the size of the flow ofimports
or by domestic recession. If, as is usually the case,.?Ian
increased flow of imports can be financedduring the initial
stabilization period only by foreign credits,an immediate question
arises: under what conditions is acountry justified in borrowing
from abroad in the present (to finance increaseddomestic consumption)
rather than accept a reduction in the level ofeconomic activity?
Again, an answer to the question is partly related to the
probability of success of the stabilizationprogram: if the country
will, in any event, revert to exchange controls anda strong bias
toward import substitution within a shortperiod, it seems to make
little sense to borrow currently and tomortgage the future for
that purpose. On the other hand, to start out withthe view that
the program is likely to fail is notacceptable, either.
Assuming that a program is started, therefore, it seemsworthwhile
to borrow from abroad in order to sustain the increasedflow of imports.50
This can be seen in several ways. Suppose a country has a marginal
propensity to import (with respect to income) of m. Then,for every
dollar borrowed from abroad, domestic income can be greater than it
otherwise could (for the same degree of liberalization) by 1/rn.
Unless the marginal propensity to import is extremely high, this
would suggest that borrowing from abroad may have a very high social
marginalproductivity, in termsof the additional level of domestic
incomeit will permit.
Another way of viewing the importance of foreign credits during
thestabilization period is to recall that increasedflows of imports
simultaneouslyliberalize the regime faster than would otherwise be
possible (except with recession) and are deflationary in that they
absorbexcess agreqatedemand.Contrasted with the alternatives of
cuttingback on the level of economic activity or of less liberalization,
financing larger import flows appears to be superior, as long asthe
stabilization program appears to have a good chance of success.
Implications for Donor Countries
The implications for aid-givers are several. First and most
important, aid to support a sustained flow of imports atthe time of
a stabilization program may, if all goes well,have a very high
marginal product if an objective of the stabilization programis to
alter the bias of the trade and payments regime. Such aid can be
used not only to finance an enlarged flow of imports, but also to
reassure potential speculators that the new policies are permanent.
Aid that simply increases reserves can be extremely productive.51
Secondly, despite the fact that a country should devalue,
considerations pertaining to the domestic political situationare
not irrelevant to the decision to undertake a stabilizationpackage,
especially its timing. Particularly since the failure of a given
stabilization policy makes the next attempt more difficult, there
is something to be said for waiting, if at allpossible, for domestic
political sentiment to support the package. While increasing demands
for new loans may force aid donors' and creditors' hands, incases
where it is feasible, postponement ofpressure to stabilize may be
warranted. In this connection, it should also be rememberedthat
other fortuitous circumstances may affect the outcomeof the
stabilization effort: especially if signs are fora below—average
crop. orfordeteriorating terms of trade, postponement of pressures
on the debtor country may be wise.
Finally, it should be remembered that a successful stabilization
program will have its significant growth impact through the resource
reallocation and restructuring of the economy thatcan result. Those
achievements, in turn, can occur only insofar as countriesare able
successfully to compete in world markets. On one hand, thatrequires
that the countries altering their regimes provideappropriate
incentives and support for their enterprisesattempting to export.
On the other hand, it also requires that donors bewilling to permit
entry of exports from LDCs into their markets. In terms of the
prospects for increased growth through alteration of the bias of
the trade regime, the most significant determinant inthe long-run52
will be the growth of world markets. For developed countries, the
creditors, as a group, maintaining free access to their markets for
the products of LDCs may be the single most important policy they
can undertake to insure the success of stabilization programs with
positive effects on the rate of economic growth.53
Footnotes
1.For economy of language, I am throughout assuming that the
rest of the world is stationary, and there is no inflation or other
change abroad. An alternative would be to phrase every statement
in terms of maintaining a constant difference in the rates of
price increase between the country under consideration and the rest
of the world. In the context of economic growth, of course, real
exchange rates may have to alter even in the absence of changes
in the inflation rate.
2. In principle, there is also a bond market in the system.
But in keeping with conventional macroeconomics, I follow the time—
honored tradition of assuming that if the money market clears or
if all three other markets taken together clear, then the bond
market must clear. In practice, among countries with convertible
currencies, it can and has been argued that the excess supply of
money is more likely reflected in an excess demand for bonds than
it is in the goods market. For present purposes, however, that
set of questions is well away from our central concern.
3.At first sight, it seems paradoxical that a higher
relative price of home goods is associated with greater production.
The paradox is resolved if one considers the move from a "full
equilibrium"under flexible exchange rates to a new "equilibrium"
with the exchange rate held constant but with aggregate demand
increased:an upward shift in the demand of home goods means54
the price of home goods must rise and production of home goods
increases. Production of traded goods falls while consumption
rises, thereby generating a payments deficit in the new "equilibrium."
Increased demand for home goods, in turn, usually arises because
of excessive money creation or fiscal policy.
4.This is not to state that the real exchange rate should
remain unaltered under all circumstances: the proposition is that
the underlying determinants of the real exchange rate that will
clear the market for traded goods are probably independent of the
determinants of the rate of inflation and changes in it.
5. For a fuller discussion of these issues, see my Foreign
Trade Renies and Economic Development: Liberalization Attempts
and Consequences,(Ballinger Press for the National Bureau of
Economic Research, 1978), especially Chapters 11 and 12.
6.There are at least two historical instances which are
well-documented and where the authorities were apparently surprised
by the preexisting level of protection prevailing. See Michael
Michaely, Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development: Israel
and Robert Baldwin, Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development:
Philippines, both (Columbia University Press for the National Bureau
of Economic Research, 1975).55
7.The analysis is similar, although not entirely symmetric,
for increasing bias toward IS. The reason for the difference is
that entrepreneurs can be expected to be more familiar with the
domestic market when IS strategies are adopted or intensified than
they can be for moving toward EP. The reason for couching the
discussion in terms of a move toward EP is that most stabilization
efforts, discussed below, entail a reduction, or an attempted
reduction, in the extent of bias toward IS.
8.If the existing bias of the regime has been relatively
shortlived at the time of the policy shift, itispossible that
excesscapacity might exist in EP lines to pick up the slack from
reduced IS activities. That outcome is less likely, the longer
IS policies have been in place. A more frequent pattern is that
IS industries find that they can cover marginal costs inexporting
out of existing capacity once incentives change. The commodity
composition of exports in the year or two after shifting strategies
therefore may bear little relation to the longer—run mix of exports.
9.All three have reverted to relatively high inflation rates
in the rnid-l970s, and seem to be encountering much more difficulty
at the present time in reducing their inflation rates than they
had earlier experienced.
10. See Jere R. Behrman, Foreign TradeRegimes and Economic
Development: Chile (Columbia University Press forthe National
Bureau of Economic Research, 1976) fora full account.56
11. Carlos Diaz-Alejandro, Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic
Development:Colombia (Columbia University Press for the National
Bureau of Economic Research, 1976).
12. It is important to recognize that foreign lending and
aid, motivated by prospects of a reasonable rate of return or for
development purposes, can sustain a current account deficit and
contribute, as long as it lasts, to development objectives. In
those cases, the current account deficit is offset by "autonomous
capital inflows. Deficits, as used in the text, refer to payments
imbalances in which the desired transactions by individuals result
in an excess demand for foreign exchange which must be met by
the authorities by running down their reserves or seeking foreign
financing which they wculd not seek simply for long—run developmental
objectives. While the distinction is conceptually clear, there are
often significant difficulties in practice of identifying particular
types of transactions as being "autonomous and others as being
uaccommodating.i In practice, however, few worry about the "deficit"
of Korea, as the financing is motivated by long—term commercial
prospects, while it is straightforward to identify countries whose
borrowing needs originate from their efforts to sustain an infeasible
exchange-rate. At the time of writing this paper, Turkey represents
a classic case of a country attempting to maintain an unrealistic
exchange rate, borrowing for that purpose in excess of the amount
she would otherwise borrow. It should be noted, however, that in an0'
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alternative economic context, Turkish net capital inflows might be
much larger than they currently are. The reason, of course, is that
commercial lending and investing has virtually ground to a halt
as expectations of an exchange rate alteration lead potential
creditors with commercial motivations to delay their activities.
13. There are exceptions, of course. Notable among them is
the Korean case. The Koreans appear to have maintained quantitative
restrictions upon import of luxury consumer goods which were not
domestically produced. Interestingly, licenses to import those
goods wereawardedto exporters, thereby linking QRs (which were
not intended as a balance of payments measure in the first place)
to profitability of exporting.
14. This is because the higher price of import—competing goods
under QRs will likely pull some resources out of the home goods
sector.
15. A regime is said to be more restrictive, the larger the
aggregate value of premiums expressed as a percentage of the landed
cost of the import bill.
16. This statement assumes that raising the price of foreign
exchange is not accompanied by a sufficient increase in aggregate
demand so that the domestic price level increases still further.
Obviously, a devaluation of x percent, followed by an increase in
the domestic price level of ax, with a >1,will lead to a decline58
inthe relative price of tradable goods and should intensify
either the restrictiveness of the regime or the size of the
deficit.
17. The empirical results from the Foreign Trade Regimes and
Economic Development project tended to confirm the results. See
Chapter 8 of my Liberalization_Attemp and the individual studies,
especially Colombia and Chile, for analysis of this phenomenon.
18.If for example, surcharges on imports and export subsidies
areremovedsimultaneously with the devaluation, the changes in the
effective exchange rates perceived by producers and consumers will
be considerably smaller than the size of the devaluation. It is
usefulto refer to net devaluation"as beingthe change in the
priceof foreign exchange once account is taken of the removal of
export subsidies, import surcharges, and the like.
19. Egon Sohmen, in "The Effects of Devaluation on the PriceLevel,"
Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 1958, madethis point.
20.The difficulties are very real. Richard Cooper, in his
"An Assessment of Currency Devaluation in Developing Countries,"
Chapter 13 of Gustav Ranis, Editor, Government and Economic Development
(Yale University Press, 1971) documented these problems neatly. A
sizable fraction of Finance Ministers at the time of devaluation
have lost their jobs within 18 months afterwards. There is no
doubt also that luck is an element. As Cooper showed, perhaps the59
best indicator of the likelihood of success is thequality of the
harvest: a good harvest provides a buffer which makes the
reallocation vastly easier. Of the 22 devaluations in the NBER
project on Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development, in 15
cases the inflation in the ensuing two years was largerproportionately
than was the initial devaluation. Seemy Foreign Trade Regimes and
Economic Development, pp. 82-83 and Table 5-3.
21. Diaz-Alejandro, op.cit, pp. 237 ff.
22. Many Latin American programs, especially those of Chile
and Argentina) seem to have been geared primarily toward inflation.
23. Turkey and India are examples of this type.
24. See Al Fishlow, "Foreign Trade Regimes and EconomicDevelopment:
Brazil, paper prepared for Bogota Seminar, April 1975, mimeo.
25. This clearly happened in Turkey following the1958
devaluation.
26. For an analysis of the political implications of donor
behavior with respect to one devaluation, seeJagdish Bhagwati and
1. N. Srinivasan, Foreign Trade Regimes and EconomicDevelopment:
India (Columbia University Press for the NBER,1975), Chapter 10.
Diaz-Alejandro, pp. cit., reports that, prior to undertaking its
own liberalization program in 1967, the Colombian presidenteven went
on television to state that he would not abide by the wishes of
Colombia's creditors60
27. Thomas Reichman and Richard Stilison, "Experience with
Programs of Balance of Payments Adjustment: Stand—By Arrangements
in the Higher Tranches, 1963_72,u IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 25, 2, P.297.
28. Liberalizing the regime cannot be carried very far without
increasing the flow of imports. In the short run, that can usually
be achieved only when financed by foreign credits, which arediscussed
below.
29. Removal or reduction of guarantee deposit requirements can
have asignificant effect on the money supply. For this reason,
it sometimes makes sense to provide for their gradual removal,
rather than to abandon them at the time of devaluation.
30. See Jose Carvaiho and Claudio Haddad, "Brazil," Chapter
2 of Anne 0. Krueger, Hal B. Lary, Terry Monson, and Narongchai
Akrasanee, Editors, Trade and Employment in DevelopingCountries -—
Strategiesand Results in Ten Countries (University of Chicago Press
for the NBER),forthcomiflg.
31. See my Liberalization Attempts, Chapter 11, for the
statistical evidence on this point for a pooled time—series cross-
section of devaluations in the NBER project countries. See also
Bela Balassa, "Exports and Economic Growth: Some Further Evidence,"
Journal of Development Economics, June 1978.61
32.In some instances, expectations ofan exchange—rate
alteration induce exporters to withhold theirgoods and importers
to stock up. Reverse flows after devaluationcan then finance
increased imports. While thatcan happen, it is difficult to
rely on it.62
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